The obligation of 'progressive realization' under the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights is often interpreted in light of available resources -this chapter examines, instead, the variable of time. Noting that delay of rights is akin to denial of rights, Young explores the various ways in which accountability models, at the international level, have elaborated on concrete, and temporal, benchmarks. These include the minimum core, and non-retrogression doctrines, and the exercises in comparative rankings. These are important sources of accountability, especially for positive obligations. And yet with the promise of rights, law nevertheless structures the expectations of rights-holders. This chapter examples how 'waiting' for rights may be an especially passive, disempowering, and anti-solidaristic experience and in so doing reveals greater insight on a tension with underlies the recognition of fundamental material interests as rights.
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housing: yet the Constitutional Court was reluctant to do more with its declaratory order than signal the infringement. Years passed before the community itself was permanently housed (Irene Grootboom herself passed away, 8 years later, waiting for relocation), and before similarly situated rights-holders could access crisis shelter. 7 Yet the concerns about courts entering the fray of government action -of ordering positive remedial action for economic and social rights enforcement -is only one aspect of the problem of waiting, to which this chapter responds. Indeed, the issue of waiting points to broader debates about economic and social rights in general. For some, the delay of legal rights calls for direct condemnation of the pretensions of 'rights' language: it is the availability of remedy -and its immediate delivery -that reveals how far a society goes in assigning heightened protection to certain interests. 8 This realist position applies to downgrade the importance of unenforceable constitutional protections in domestic settings, just as it applies to demote unenforceable human rights protections within the international framework. 9 Others, on the other hand, regard the ubiquity of waiting as not significant per se, whether because the law cannot always be expected to replicate the moral duties that are appropriately attached to rights, or because positive obligations are just as critical in satisfying the values of human dignity or freedom as negative ones, however more difficult to hold to account.
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My own view does not fall neatly under either position, which I see as replicating now-surpassed debates -as to whether economic, social and cultural rights are 'really' human rights; 11 or as to 7 A nuanced assessment of the delays experienced, for the implementation of a national emergency housing policy, on the one hand, and the settlement order, on the other, see resources' releases certain states from the stringency of immediate duties to realize rights. 15 In this chapter, however, I focus on the standards that apply to the passing of time in general. By examining this development, the aim of this chapter is to explore how the experience of waiting has been identified by those interpreting economic and social rights -to food, health care, housing, education and social security -under the ICESCR. This discussion therefore engages a body of analysis -contained in general comments and concluding observations -that are often dismissed as concealing the 'actual' controls on authoritative bodies, and on the states whose behaviour they themselves seek to control. Although this criticism is especially reserved for international bodies, such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which interprets the ICESCR, it is also levied at domestic courts engaged with the rights guarantees of public law. Yet to dismiss such analysis is to ignore the institutionalized forms of reason-giving pursued in legal pronouncements -such that we cease talking about reasons altogether. This chapter therefore elects to approach the problem of waiting through this lens. Readers sceptical of doctrinal exegesis are invited to take its contribution as conceptual only, in reconciling the import of postponable, if optimizable, rights.
Part III turns briefly to history, to examine the alternative concepts that had been discussed at the time of drafting the ICESCR, such as the express inclusion of time frames and time limits in the duty of progressive realization. Furthermore, I address the question as to whether the acceptance of waiting has been based on a binary understanding of temporality -as either absolute (immediate obligations) or flexibility (unaccountable and perhaps indefinite delay). Part IV of this chapter calls for a more variegated understanding of the stakes of waiting. Initiating an inquiry into these effects provides a more focused argument as to how an 'optimizing' view of rights may be defeated, due to the docility, passivity, and anti-solidarity that can be created for rights-holders themselves. The chapter closes with preliminary thoughts about how economic and social rights law could develop with a more nuanced understanding of the problem of waiting and its complexity.
II. The curious case of progressive realization
In concluding a common standard of achievement for human rights, the United Nations General approach requires all rights to be given the greatest degree of respect, proportionate to the interests of others; an assessment which takes into account both the degree of rights-deprivation and the time in which it is experienced.
And indeed, this obligation of 'progressive realization' also ties well into contemporary theories of rights. For instance, a 'maximizing' theory of consequential 'goal rights', defends the view that rights can be realized according to a variable, contextual, scale. Under this leading philosophical standpoint, the variability of the standard of obligation does not convert such claims to a category of non-right, but instead merely supplements the 'perfect obligations' that delineate certain forms of rights-based action with 'imperfect obligations' that are more varied, 21 This criticism is related to the idea of human rights backsliding, which documents the phenomenon of too-low an international standard in international human rights norms exerting a 'downward pull on high-performing states,' linked causally to their membership of the human rights regime: see Andrew T. The duty to realize rights progressively has also been influential domestically, and the language of the ICESCR appears within several constitutions that entrench economic and social rights. Internationally, the doctrinal elaboration of the concept of progressive realization began in earnest in 1990, after the opening created by the end of the Cold War, and the pressures of an increasing number of decolonized states. 34 At that time, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights described progressive realization as a 'necessary flexibility device' for economic, social and cultural rights. 35 In an influential General Comment outlining its meaning, the Committee commended the doctrine for its ability to accommodate 'the realities of the real world … and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization.' 36 Recognizing the very different resources available to states, the Committee's approach was to emphasize the variation in what should be considered for different state parties with different resources available to them. In a well-cited formulation, states were 'to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards [full realization]. … Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures … would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified.' 37 The Committee at that time was thus alert to the temporal burden of progressive realization, and sought to defend the doctrine it was shaping against perceptions of indefinite delay. One aspect of this approach was to emphasize the similarities of the standard with the ICCPR, and the obligation of states to respect and ensure the relevant rights -understood by the Human Rights
Committee as immediate in character. 38 The Chair of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Philip Alston, with co-author Gerard Quinn, had criticized the 'artificiality of the idealized way in which the immediate/progressive distinction is often portrayed', 39 and pointed to obligations under the ICESCR that were expressly immediate. The right to fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value, for example, 40 and the right to form trade unions, 41 were emphasized as taking immediate effect. 42 The Committee's later General
Comments invariably affirmed that obligations of non-discrimination should be appropriately understood as immediate, especially as they need not be resource-dependent; 43 other obligations should include 'deliberate, concrete and targeted' steps, even if not immediate. 44 As we will see below, however, some of the nominally 'immediate' obligations of non-discrimination, such as those stipulating that policies to eliminate discrimination on racial and gender grounds be pursued 'without delay' 45 nevertheless allow for a varied understanding of their punctuality.
Both immediacy and progressiveness accommodated the idea that some time was required.
The approach thus epitomized a teleological emphasis that has become a feature of the postwar human rights regime: providing advocates with a standard for calling out non-fulfilment, but structure of accountability within international law: ratification is premised on the idea that states may be presently failing to comply with the terms of a treaty, but agree to do so over time.
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Not surprisingly, efforts to refine the doctrine of progressive realization have diverged. Some commentators have focused on the question of resources, and how they can be measured.
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Others have advanced interpretations of each right that remove their variability, or have instead come up with separate metrics to assess and compare states' performance. These approaches are detailed below -and while they can be thought to supplement the progressive realization standard, it is suggested that they each, in their own way, fail to address the variable of time.
B. Supplements to progressive realization
The first important supplement to the concept of progressive realization is the 'minimum core' permissible delay. 55 That interpretation, which reinforces the connection between the minimum core and temporal accountability, was recently confirmed in a prominent analysis commissioned by the World Bank. 56 Under that view, the minimum core applies to all obligations that must be realized immediately; obligations left out of the 'core' are those with lesser priority. A concern with this reading of the minimum core is, of course, that the broad promise of economic and social rights is left, in the main, to the indefinite category; and immediate duties are restricted to minimal ones. 57 To some extent, this concern equates with a broader unease that economic and social rights law has become too focused on a subsistence-based, ameliorative interpretation of rights at the expense of targeting the broader concerns of distributive justice, such as economic inequality. 58 In so far as inequality can also be seen as heightened by -or indeed constituted bywaiting, a narrow, minimalistic interpretation of the core does the same thing.
A second approach is the standard of 'non-retrogression', which supplements the concept of progressive realization by focusing on current baselines. The idea, which the Committee also adopted in 1990, and elaborated increasingly during the economic crises that followed, was to interpret progressive realization as consistent with the idea of a heightened obligation to prevent any retraction of current rights-realization. Non-retrogression was thus related to the idea of selfappointed benchmarks for state performance, but one pegged in real time: allowing every state to be scrutinized for any backward step in respect of economic and social rights. Since the Committee's introduction of the notion that 'deliberately retrogressive measures' would have to be justified by state parties, the concept of 'non-retrogression' has become increasingly detailed. 59 The Committee has suggested that a heightened level of scrutiny attends to such 55 indicators, tends to accept a shifting temporal horizon, in which the independent variable of time plays no dependent rights-infringing role, outside of the context of 'structural indicators' that assess the stipulated time frames in state planning. These aspects are analysed in the next section.
This contrasts strikingly with the experience of time, and in particular waiting, to which the final section turns. The previously approaches to understanding 'progressive realization' -sounding in the minimum core concept, non-retrogression, or comparative ranking -are connected differently with time. In the first, the minimum core analysis removes time as an adjustable standard: the core obligations are immediate and no delay is countenanced, although non-core obligations are tolerated as those for which the postponement of realization is acceptable (although, in at least some accounts, still accountable 73 ). In the second, non-retrogression views time as a path in which materialization may progress, and thus flags moves in the wrong direction: the present status quo must be protected, and any diminishment of rights-protections are immediately suspect (although may be justified on certain proportionate, often time-sensitive terms). 74 
III. Temporal accountability in the ICESCR

A. Time frames and time limits
Earlier debates about the ICESCR reveal that a more robust temporal accountability was suggested. In the original formulation of progressive realization, there were proposals to insert time limits into the concept. The Third Committee of the General Assembly and the United Nations Human Rights Commission, when negotiating the treaties, debated the idea. The representative of the newly independent Congo, for example, proposed to include a reasonable time limit under progressive realization, on the theory of converting certain obligations to a more timely, calculable, and reliable standard. 77 Such a proposal was opposed by the representative from Chile, who felt that states should be entitled to proceed according to a time scale determined by their own resources; 78 a view that ultimately carried. Similarly, a proposal by Costa Rica to introduce the words 'and at an accelerated rate' after the word 'progressively' was aimed at preventing the use of delaying tactics by state parties. 79 During a working group, the Egyptian delegate Mahmud Azmi had argued that the phrase 'if necessary' should be inserted after the term 'progressively', thereby signalling the applicability of the clause only to obligations requiring time. 80 Again, these amendments were not accepted, and the Third Committee responsible for drafting the two covenants settled on the current formula of progressive realization for the ICESCR, 81 with significant support from the U.S.
This is not to say that timelines and timeliness were not introduced elsewhere. Discrete obligations were accompanied by a more fixed time scale. The obligation to secure free and compulsory primary education for children, for example, was made temporally accountable in both conduct and result. States presently without primary education were required, on becoming a party, to commit to undertake, 'within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action … within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan'. 82 Similarly, the reporting requirement for states was also accompanied by a stipulated time period -of one year.
In the intervening half century of the Committee's scrutiny over state reports, Concluding
Observations, and its multiple General Comments, new methods to monitor, if not regulate, the passing of time have been introduced. For example, the requirement of explicit time frames is present within many 'structural indicators' for economic and social rights. Routinely, discrete economic and social rights measurements depend upon the 'time frame and coverage of national policy': for example, the structural indicators for indicating the progressive realization of the right to health include time frames for national policies on sexual and reproductive health, abortion, foetal sex determination policy, child health and nutrition, physical and mental health, medicines access, and for national policies for persons with disabilities. 84 Measures to promote the rights of the child, as well as the right to food, have included time frames for achievement. 85 In measures to realize the right to housing, public housing programs are required to have, alongside plans of action, and in a concession to the perspective of rights-holders, published and transparent wait lists, with express estimates of fulfilment. 86 And when the Committee has outlined action in relation to austerity, it required time frames in which steps were to be taken. progressive realization, they also challenge the immediate/progressive distinction that has proved so immovable. The distinction is especially problematic when invoked to maintain the separation of the categories of so-called 'first generation' and 'second generation' human rights. This is because it is inaccurate. For instance, the obligations to 'respect and protect' civil and political rights under the ICCPR, 90 despite lying outside of notions of 'progressive realization', and understood as subject to 'immediate effect', also record acceptable time frames for compliance.
A right to a trial without undue delay, for example, is specified in a number of international human rights treaties. While there is no specific time frame by which the trial must occur, 91 commentators suggest that a 20 month maximum may have crystallized. The prohibition on cruel and degrading treatment is also accompanied by time periods for respecting certain obligations, such as by when medical care should be provided to prisoners (in an appropriate and timely fashion). 92 The Human Rights Committee has suggested that 'immediacy' does not equate with 'instant'.
Moreover, if an infringement of a civil and/or political right is found on a large scale, a measure of delay may be a feature of redress. For example, commentators have noted that perhaps the most quintessentially 'negative', 'immediate' obligation (the prohibition on torture) may entail a timed roll-out for remediation. 93 Similarly, even obligations of non-discrimination -which the Committee has recognized as immediate -are often accompanied by some delay. The classic equal protection case of Brown v. Board of Education, to take a prominent domestic example, was met with a rolled-out remedy; the United States Supreme Court requiring states to end school segregation 'with all deliberate speed'. 94 Only through repeated litigations did that obligation crystallize into a more immediate requirement.
A common thread in measuring time, in relation to the purportedly 'immediate' obligations attached to civil and political rights, is to ascertain its proportionality: the duration of rightsdeprivation must not be disproportionate. This standard works with a robust assumption around the importance of civil and political rights and the seriousness of infringement. Yet the standard of proportionality has proved less robust as against infringements of economic and social rights. 95 Along with the deference of assessment mentioned above, the failure to realize economic and social rights have long been associated with explicit discrimination, patterns of prejudice and internalized low expectations. 96 This presents the worry that adjudicators or assessors measuring the proportionality of delay for economic and social rights realization will be more deferential and/or tolerate greater periods of deprivation. One response to this problem is to increase time-based measures into assessments of rights infringements. Another, pursued in an introductory manner below, is to examine more carefully one impact of delay -in particular, the experience of waiting -to highlight its effect on putative rights-claimants. 
IV. Waiting for Progressive Realization
The primary aim of this chapter is to draw attention to the relative absence of temporal accountability among contemporary interpretations of economic and social rights, drawing attention to the 'progressive realization' standard of obligation and its supplements under the ICESCR. Clearly, the recognition of 'immediate' obligations, and the development of time frames and time limits, give some prominence to the unacceptability of delay in certain cases.
Yet my claim is that our assessment of economic and social rights requires both more developed metrics -of how long a delay is too long -and a more nuanced approach to time. In this latter respect, I argue that waiting for rights can conflict with other basic goals of rights recognition. In making clear this argument, it is worth turning from the perspective of the state to the perspective of the rights-holder: to how time is experienced, rather than measured. Although the state is obviously present in structuring this experience, this perspective points to a compounded experience of rights deprivation, that has its own effects on rights.
The modern experience of time is an accelerated one: as a result of drastic changes in transportation, communication, production and exchange technologies, the pace of life has, by many accounts, sped up. 97 When we perceive delay and are forced to wait for goods, services, or opportunities, for example, we are often only experiencing the impression of delay -an impatience which may be linked to the immense time savings that many of us currently enjoy, in comparison with previous forms of delivery or fulfilment.
98 And yet these time savings have been disproportionality distributed, and the experience of delay is oftentimes material -and ubiquitous -for certain groups, particularly persons with disabilities, women, and ethnic minorities, and particular those whose ascriptive status intersects -as they more often do -with the experience of poverty. It is in this accelerated, stratified era, that the delay structured into rights realization -and gaps in the international doctrine of progressive realization -take on new significance. A clear implication should be that, at the very least, the measurement of time -and accountability of delay -must include an assessment -from the perspective of the rights-holder -of waiting. The justification of 'waiting', implicit in the notion of progressive realization, is I suggest at odds with the moral agency and mobilization associated with rights. This is partly, too, an effect of its unequal distribution. Along with the capitalist premise that 'time is money', commodified time allows those who can afford it to purchase the removal of delay, leaving those who cannot to simply wait. The result is a new form of differentiation between the haves and the have-nots that must enter into analyses of rights.
Of course, this experience of waiting is not wholly separable from the teleology of the postwar human rights project. As mentioned above, the UDHR settled on an international symbol of human progress: a trajectory of advancement that Mark Goodale has analogized to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 'arc of the moral universe'. 99 For Goodale, the universalism of human rights is suggestive of a 'moral mirage: it attracts people to it, but it gets fainter the closer the approach'. 100 This is not necessarily inimical to the mobilizing potential of human rights:
Goodale is among those who assert that the gap between the experience of rights and their appeal and legitimacy does not necessarily undermine the strength of the discourse. 101 Others are more skeptical, suggesting that the failure to deliver on the promise of much human rights rhetoric, while not necessarily invalidating rights arguments, can nonetheless weaken them. Clearly, frustration with waiting can trigger the social movement action necessary for rights materialization to occur. 104 And yet the experience of delay can also work in other ways. While it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide comprehensive evidence of the effects of waiting, I
want to conclude with a number of observations, suggestive of a number of new questions for the field. This takes me, not to ethnographies of human rights, but rather to ethnographies of waiting that have been developed in the social sciences, particular those that track how the daily experiences of ordinary people construct an idea of the state. 105 Such accounts have been slow to appear -the difficulties of observing the absence, rather than the presence, of a recordable activity, have often directed researchers' attention elsewhere. 106 Moreover, there is a common sense acceptance of the inevitability of waiting: 'everybody -state officials, social workers, and the poor themselves -thinks of the waiting of the destitute as something obvious and unavoidable.' 107 This acceptance of waiting may be one more aspect of the adaptive preferences and 'realism' that can mislead many about the misfortunes -or rights infringements -they experience.
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By contrasting these ethnographies of waiting with the delay factored into rights, I want to suggest that theories of rights need to be more sensitive to time from the point of view of rightsholders: not in any absolutist sense of avoiding the demarcation of special interests as 'rights' if they cannot be realized immediately; but rather in a more context-sensitive appreciation of its 
A. Protracted Waiting
First, the waiting associated with the realization of rights has assumed a protracted, extended, form, in many parts of the world.
terms. Anthropologist James Ferguson has observed a shift, in fieldwork in Africa, 'from a focus on temporal dynamics of societal progress toward a new reliance on individual spatial mobility':
that agency is accessed not by reliance on progress, but on egress. 112 Discrete increases in waiting time are certainly in evidence in both the Global North and South, such as in the delivery of health care, education, or water services. 113 The growing privatization of many sectors, while vaunted as increasing efficiency in service delivery, often externalizes many costs through time. While market tools can actively minimize the wait for those who are able to pay, they increase it substantially for others. 114 Arguably, then, the turn to market-based reforms make time measures all the more pressing, as well as other benchmarks.
This feature of extended waiting is complicated by the fact that, although it can be structured generally by the law, the experience of waiting is not universal. People experience waiting subjectively -and it can be surmised that the very young and very old, or the sick or disabled, experience greater costs than others who wait. Yet these costs are unaccounted for in assigning economic value to time, as a loss of opportunity to otherwise increase social utility or productivity. 115 The burden of protracted waiting is therefore only glimpsed by time-based statistics of passing days, months or years. A non-linear, non-chronological, understanding of waiting must also be factored into these assessments.
B. Uncertain Waiting
Second, alongside protracted waiting comes disempowerment, independently occurring alongside the rights-deprivation in question. In many ethnographic studies, the experience of waiting is directly connected to the hopes that people have inscribed, of a particular future, which continue to elude them. only the prolonged experience of deprivation, but also the creation of confusion, uncertainty and the reinforcement of subordination and political resignation in the lives of the poor. This experience of bureaucratic control of the waiting experience was reinforced by arbitrary actions, reversals, and inconsistencies. 'Those in need,' he described, 'come to the welfare office and are faced with the general disorganization and disinformation … along with endless delays and also with the sudden rising of surprise paydays, and therefore they quickly learn that this is a space to be a complying welfare client.' This reduces them to act, suggests Auyero, 'not as citizens with rightful claims but as patients of the state.'
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These findings are also consistent with the more general studies of waiting, which, although dependent on the object of the wait, summarize the impressions of their subjects that 'uncertain waits are longer than known, finite waits,' 'unexplained waits are longer than explained waits,'
'unfair waits are longer than reasonable waits,' 'the more valuable the service, the more patience the customer will show'; and 'solo waits feel longer than group waits.' 122 Commonly documented experiences of waiting for state goods and services are those of general limbo and passivity -one researcher categorized the experiences of 'surplus time,' 'heightened suspense,'
'lost time,' and 'panic and inertia,' 123 These experiences should be evaluated as independent from (although of course compounded by) any cognizable rights-deprivation. But of course, such findings become even more poignant and urgent when related to the dignity, freedom, and equality concerns of rights, which are addressed to interests of special concern.
C. Competition through Waiting
Finally, where agency exists, the experience of waiting introduces a different political dimension to rights. In previous work, I have observed that waiting for action by the state can engender enmity between similarly situated claimants, as to who should be served first. In other words, waiting inserts the logic of competition where situational similarity invites a logic of 121 cooperation. 124 This compounds the noted individuation that can occur in the politics of rights, whereby the backdrop of claim-making, litigation, and individualized remedies can sometimes split collective efforts to secure resources. In my work on the tensions created within 'queues'
for goods and services to be provided by the state, I found that the institutionalized waiting often narrowed the expectations of realization 'to an idealized priority line'. 125 Those waiting often assumed that others who succeeded in accessing housing, or health care, had done so only as a result of 'jumping the queue': through illicit payments, political connections, or 'unjust' appeals to rights. This included those who had approached lawyers and courts to prevent evictions, or who litigated for health care outside of a waitlist. 126 Although occurring in very different settings, these examples revealed tensions in the way that individual cases were given priority, or were assumed to have gained priority.
Waiting for rights could, in theory, engender the type of solidarity and agitation that have been central to rights campaigns; 127 yet such forms of social mobilization become notoriously more complex in campaigns for services rather than mere resistance. Moreover, waiting itself stratifies, just as non-recognition of rights can do. 128 This means that, while rights agitation can be engendered, it can just as readily be thwarted. In part, this is because a focus on waiting draws claimants' political focus to direct forms of state assistance, distracting from the more nuanced, regulative, modes in which rights, especially economic and social rights, can be realized. My research on the 'queue talk' around housing, for example, distracted from the political stakes of other issues, such as mortgage subsidies, or zoning protections, just as it insisted on the patience of those on the list. 129 These political effects also run counter to the hopes of agitation and mobilization inherent in rights.
